physical_protection
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physical_protection [2012/06/19 03:48] – [Chemical protection] mcmaster | physical_protection [2014/01/15 14:23] (current) – [LOPPER] azonenberg | ||
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====== Die ID ====== | ====== Die ID ====== | ||
- | National claims they have some sort of anti-reverse engineering protection with their die ID scheme. Who knows if it does anything useful. | ||
- | ====== | + | National, Xilinx, and many other vendors have unique per-chip serial numbers stored in some sort of OTP memory on the chip. The user's firmware presumably uses this in a licensing scheme. Might make for a halfway decent anti-cloning system (until the check is found and nopped out) but is useless for preventing RE. |
+ | |||
+ | ====== | ||
+ | |||
+ | ===== Chemical protection ===== | ||
+ | Very rare. I've been told that some high end military chips may have a thin layer of alkali metal put into them. The idea being if exposed to most techniques, it will react violently and destroy the chip. With proper chemical treatment and machining, such high end chip protections can usually be avoided. It may be best to destroy one chip to analyze protections and then attacking the actual chip to be imaged/ | ||
We've read that some mil chips can have alkali metals to react with the strong acids typically used during decapsulation. | We've read that some mil chips can have alkali metals to react with the strong acids typically used during decapsulation. | ||
- | NanoFoil maybe? | + | In our assessment, while it may look interesting at a first glance this is very unlikely to be used in practice simply because alkali metals diffuse very fast and destroy CMOS devices. The problems involved in keeping them separate are likely to be great enough that an alternative self-destruct method would be used. |
+ | |||
+ | ===== Connoisseur Coating ===== | ||
+ | |||
+ | Developed by LLNL as part of the " | ||
+ | |||
+ | It's not clear what this material is. Various public sources give conflicting definitions: | ||
+ | * A [[http:// | ||
+ | * [[http:// | ||
+ | ===== Explosive ===== | ||
+ | |||
+ | ==== LOPPER ==== | ||
+ | |||
+ | LOPPER was an experimental program to plant "tiny, non-violent, | ||
+ | |||
+ | They conclude by saying they are currently in pursuit of " | ||
+ | |||
+ | [[http:// | ||
+ | ==== Guesses ==== | ||
+ | |||
+ | NanoFoil maybe? | ||
+ | * http:// | ||
+ | * http:// | ||
+ | |||
+ | Would react explosively with all wet decap chemistries we're aware of. MSDS and safety documentation suggests it's sensitive to physical shock and heat as well (though perhaps not quite as much as, say, flash powder). | ||
+ | |||
+ | Much safer to the chip (until detonated) than alkali metals since it's based on heavy metals (Ni and Al) which don't diffuse nearly as easily. Could be treated much like a conventional metalization layer from the fab's perspective. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Without reading too much on the chemistry, it looks like it'd be triggered by heating regardless of the presence of oxygen. This means that even plasma-based etches would have to be done very carefully and slowly to prevent heating the sample to the point of detonation. | ||
+ | |||
+ | The best way of defeating such protection would most likely be something along these lines: (In all steps emphasis would be on slow, deliberate etches with a minimum of heat released or required.) | ||
+ | - Mill package to just above bond wires | ||
+ | - Slow SF6 + O2 plasma etch to remove remainder of packaging compound. (A typical RIE process for SiO2 given in "Etch Rates for Micromachining Processes, pt 2" uses 25sccm of SF6. Adding 10sccm of O2 increases the etch rate against SiO2 as well as making it attack organics like photoresist. Since typical chip encapsulation is ~80% by wt of SiO2 microspheres in an organic epoxy matrix, this is a desirable side effect.) | ||
+ | - Ni seems to lack any good RIE chemistries. The best option for removing the actual metal layers is likely a very dilute (1% or less) HCl solution, which will attack both Ni and Al while keeping the etch slow and cool. Toward the end it will be critical to avoid attacking aluminum/ | ||
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- Hacking the PIC 18F1320: http:// | - Hacking the PIC 18F1320: http:// | ||
- http:// | - http:// | ||
+ | - A history of US COMSEC: http:// | ||
physical_protection.1340077685.txt.gz · Last modified: 2013/10/20 14:59 (external edit)